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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to Section 
78-2a-3(2)(h) of the Utah Code. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Upon the answer and evidence taken, the Court shall determine whether the person 
proceeded against is guilty of the contempt charged. If the Court finds the person is 
guilty of the contempt, the Court may impose a fine not exceeding $1,000, order the 
person incarcerated in the county jail not exceeding 30 days, or both. However, a 
justice Court judge or court commissioner may punish for contempt by a fine not to 
exceed $500.00 or by incarceration for five days or both. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-32-10. Contempt — Action by Court. 
If an actual loss or injury to a party in an action or special proceeding, prejudicial to 
his rights therein, is caused by the contempt, the Court, in addition to the fine or 
imprisonment imposed for the contempt or in place thereof, may order the person 
proceeded against to pay the party aggrieved a sum of money sufficient to indemnify 
him and to satisfy his costs and expenses; which order and the acceptance of money 
under it is bar to an action by the aggrieved party for such loss and injury. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-32-11. Damages to party aggrieved. 
When the contempt consists in the omission to perform an act enjoined by law, which 
is yet in the power of the person to perform, he may be imprisoned until he shall 
perform it, or until released by the Court, and in such case the act must be specified 
in the warrant of commitment. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-32-12. Imprisonment to compel performance. 
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STATEMENT OF CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
AND DISPOSITION IN COURT 
This action began on March 26,1993 when Plaintiff filed a Verified Motion for 
Order to Show Cause to enforce certain provisions of the parties' divorce decree.1 In particular, 
the Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant had failed to pay her certain proceeds from the 
"HHEICO contract," as directed by the decree. The HHEICO contract was acquired during the 
marriage and consisted of a promissory note secured by real estate. The Defendant was the 
named beneficiary of the note. The divorce Court awarded the Plaintiff 65% of the net proceeds 
of the HHEICO contract, which provided her with an income of $505.00 per month.2 ( R. 293-
316). At the time of filing her Motion, the Plaintiff did not know why her payments from the 
HHEICO contract had ceased. She later found that the Defendant had pledged the contract as 
security for a high risk loan and had subsequently lost the same by default. (R. 628-9. 392-3. 
637-9, 660-2, 721-728, 739-743, 746). 
The Plaintiff's Motion was heard on June 1,1993 by the Honorable Thomas N. Arnett. 
Among other things, Commissioner Arnett recommended that judgment be awarded in favor of 
*The parties were divorced on May 21, 1991. 
Paragraph 7 of the divorce decree provides, "The Plaintiff is awarded sixty-five percent 
(65%) of the net proceeds of the HHEICO contract and the Defendant is awarded thirty-five 
percent (35%) of the net proceeds of the HHEICO contract. The current net proceeds from the 
HHEICO contract are $777.00 per. (sic) The Plaintiff is entitled to receive 505.05 per month and 
the Defendant is entitled to receive 271.95 per month from the HHEICO contract. In the event the 
net amount received from the HHEICO contract shall differ from the $777.00 per month, then the 
parties shall divide the net proceeds sixty-five percent (65%) to the Plaintiff and thirty-five percent 
(35%) to the Defendant." 
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Plaintiff for the HHEICO contract arrears and certified the issue of contempt for trial. (R. 322). 
The Defendant objected to the Commissioner's recommendation and a hearing on his objections 
was held on August 11,1993 before the Honorable Anne M. Stirba. (R. 323-333, 336-340, 346). 
At the hearing, the Defendant claimed that the divorce decree did not forbid him from selling or 
encumbering the contract and that the Plaintiff was only entitled to 65% of whatever proceeds he 
received from the note. In other words, if the Defendant's sale or disposal of the contract 
resulted in no proceeds, the Plaintiff would get 65% of nothing. The Court, in ruling on the 
matter, indicated that it appeared that the divorce decree did not restrict the Defendant from 
selling the contract, but that the Plaintiff was entitled to 65% of the net proceeds from the sale of 
the note. The Court further ruled that whether the note was discounted inappropriately in 
violation of the decree and the issue of contempt should be reserved for trial. The Court added, 
"there would need to be information presented to the Court as to the market value of that note 
maybe at the time of the decree but certainly at the time it was sold, and what attempts were 
made to sell it and whether it was discounted inappropriately." (R. 442-445). 
Pursuant to Judge Stirba's August 11 ruling, a trial was conducted on October 15, 
1993. At trial, the Court heard testimony concerning the nature of the HHEICO contract and 
how it was lost. The Court also heard testimony concerning the number of payments left owing 
on the contract, its present value, and the reasons given for the Defendant's actions in connection 
therewith. (R. 623-698). After hearing the evidence, the Court determined that the Defendant 
did not have the right to encumber or sell the HHEICO contract without obtaining the Plaintiff's 
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prior consent. The Court found the Defendant in contempt of paragraph 7 of the divorce decree 
and made the following ruling: 
... [T]he Defendant is ordered to pay Plaintiff the amount of 
$505.05 per month, beginning the first day of the month following 
the entry of the final order in this matter, for 218 months, for a 
total equal to the amount that Plaintiff would have received under 
the HHEICO contract had the Defendant not lost it of $110,100.90 
($505.05 X 218 = $110,100.90). 
The Defendant is further ordered to serve 30 days in the 
Salt Lake County Jail for his contempt of Court. The jail sentence 
shall be suspended so long as Defendant complies in a timely 
manner with the payment provisions set forth above. In the event 
he defaults in any of the conditions, he shall be ordered to serve all 
30 days without any further suspension. 
Also, in the event the Defendant defaults in his monthly 
payment obligation to Plaintiff, the Plaintiff shall determine the net 
present value of the balance remaining to be owed to Plaintiff by 
discounting the dollar amount by the contract rate (9.75%) and 
shall be entitled to a judgment in that amount. So long as 
Defendant is current in his monthly obligations, Plaintiff shall be 
stayed from executing on the judgment. 
Plaintiff is also awarded her reasonable and necessarily 
incurred attorney's fees and costs in connection with this matter 
which the Court finds to be $2,008.35. (R. 390-396). 
In response to the Court's ruling, the Defendant filed a Motion to Alter or Amend 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment or in the alternative Motion for a 
New Trial. Among other things, the Defendant complained that the Court's August and October 
rulings were inconsistent. In August, he argued, the Court stated that the divorce decree did not 
restrict him from selling the contract. Then, in October, the Court reversed itself and found that 
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the Defendant did not have the right to unilaterally encumber the HHEICO contract. The 
Defendant claimed he had been prejudiced because he had prepared for trial based on the 
Court's August 11,1993 ruling and would have prepared differently had he known the Court's 
ruling would change. (R. 398-466). 
In order to allow the Defendant a full opportunity to present his case, and to clarify any 
misunderstandings, the Court reopened the trial "for the limited purpose of hearing evidence 
concerning whether the Defendant had the right under the Decree to encumber the HHEICO 
contract, whether he had a right to encumber the contract without the consent of the Plaintiff, and 
whether his conduct of pledging the HHEICO contract without the Plaintiff's consent constitutes 
contempt of Court." (R. 485-490). Based on this ruling, a second trial was held on August 31, 
1994. At the end of testimony, Judge Stirba again ruled that the Defendant did not have the right 
to encumber or sell the HHEICO contract, found him in contempt thereof, and made findings and 
rulings similar to those made after the October 15th trial. (R. 553-560). After resolution of 
objections to the final documents, the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
and Judgment were signed on December 13,1994. (R. 590-602). The Defendant filed his Notice 
of Appeal on January 23, 1995. (R. 612). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties were divorced by a decree of the trial Court on May 21,1991. (R. 
268). 
2. Paragraph 7 of the Divorce Decree provides as follows: 
The Plaintiff is awarded 65% of the net proceeds of the HHEICO 
contract and the Defendant is awarded 35% of the net proceeds of 
the HHEICO contract. The current net proceeds from the 
HHEICO contract are $777 per. (sic) The Plaintiff is entitled to 
receive $505.05 per month and the Defendant is entitled to receive 
$271.95 per month from the HHEICO contract. In the event the 
net amount received from the HHEICO contract shall differ from 
the $777 per month, then the parties shall divide the net proceeds 
65% to the Plaintiff and 35% to the Defendant. (R. 271, 272). 
3. The HHEICO contract resulted from the sale of an apartment building in which 
the Defendant had an interest. The sale took place approximately 15 years ago and the 
Defendant was given a promissory note to secure his interest. The note was assumed by several 
different parties over the years. On May 29,1990, and pursuant to a further sale of the note, the 
Defendant was given an All Inclusive Promissory Note secured by an All Inclusive Trust Deed in 
the amount of $274,993.08. This note is what is referred to in the Divorce Decree as the 
HHEICO contract. Pursuant to the terms of the note, the makers were obligated to pay 
Defendant the amount of $2,577.46 each month beginning June 20,1990. After paying various 
senior notes and encumbrances, $777.00 was left as net proceeds to be distributed pursuant to 
the terms of the Divorce Decree. As set forth above, the HHEICO contract was secured by real 
property. (R. 368-9, 392-3, 634-7, 717-8, 731, 733-4; Exhibit P-4). 
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4. In or about November of 1992, the Defendant borrowed $25,000.00 from 
David Moench and pledged the HHEICO contract as security. The money borrowed from 
Moench was paid directly to LaRoy Orr so that Mr. Orr could purchase an option on some 
mining property in Nevada. The Defendant was promised a return of $10,000.00 in addition to 
the amount invested within 30 days and was also promised stock in the company which was to 
purchase the land. The stock was penny stock traded on the Canadian stock exchange. None of 
the promises made to the Defendant were secured by property of any kind. It was a completely 
unsecured loan. (R. 392-3, 637-9, 658, 660-662, 721-728, 739-743, 746). 
5. The Defendant was represented by counsel in the divorce proceedings, 
received a copy of the divorce decree, had read the same, was familiar with the provisions 
contained therein, and did not formally object to any of the provisions. (R. 633-4, 706, 734-6). 
6. The Defendant was aware of the provision in the divorce decree concerning the 
HHEICO contract from the time the divorce was granted, consented to the same, and agreed that 
the Plaintiff be awarded 65% of the proceeds of the contract. Furthermore, it was never agreed, 
implied or discussed that the Defendant would have the right to encumber the HHEICO contract. 
(R. 634, 706, 736). 
7. At the time the HHEICO contract was pledged, the Defendant was fully aware 
of the provisions set forth in the divorce decree which gave Plaintiff 65% of the proceeds, and 
knew she had an interest therein. He also had a copy of the decree at the time. Prior to pledging 
the contract, the Defendant had been paying Plaintiff her share of the proceeds. (R. 706, 737, 
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750-1). 
8. The Defendant did not tell the Plaintiff that he was pledging the HHEICO 
contract as security nor did he ask for her consent in doing so. (R. 639-40, 737-8). 
9. The $25,000 loan was due on or about the first week of January, 1993. The 
Defendant defaulted on the loan and lost the HHEICO contract to David Moench. The HHEICO 
contract was subsequently sold to the Defendant's brother-in-law. (R. 642, 637-8, 721-8). 
10. At the time he pledged the HHEICO contract as security, the Defendant was 
aware that the note could be lost and that it was, in his words, a "moderate risk." (R. 644-6). 
11. At the time the HHEICO contract was lost, the balance owing on the contract 
was $262,951.41, with 218 payments remaining. Pursuant to the divorce decree, the Plaintiff 
was entitled to payments of $505.05 per month for 218 months. (R. 393-4, 666-7; Exhibits P-5, 
P-6). 
12. The present value of the Plaintiffs interest in the HHEICO contract, based on 
receiving $505.05 per month for 218 months at an interest rate of 9.75% (the contract rate), is 
$51,509.37. (R. 383). 
13. The Plaintiff relied upon the HHEICO contract proceeds for her support. (R. 
743). 
14. The Defendant did not encumber the HHEICO contract because of financial 
necessity. (R. 749-50). 
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15. The total amount of money that the Plaintiff would have received under the 
HHEICO contract had the Defendant not lost the same is $110,100.90. ($505.05 times 218) (R. 
550). 
16. The Plaintiff has incurred attorney fees in prosecuting this matter in the 
amount of $2,708.35 and will incur additional attorney fees in defending this appeal. (R. 601). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Defendant's appeal should be dismissed because the issues raised therein are not 
appealable. The Court's contempt order is an order of "civil contempt," and is not, therefore, 
appealable as a matter of right. 
The Defendant was properly found in contempt of Court for the following reasons: 
1. The divorce decree awarded the Plaintiff a property interest in the HHEICO 
contract. The Defendant did not have the right to sell, encumber or risk losing the contract 
without the Plaintiff's consent. 
2. The Defendant, with full knowledge of the terms set forth in the divorce decree 
and their effect on the HHEICO contract, and without the Plaintiffs consent, pledged the 
HHEICO contract to secure a high risk investment. The HHEICO contract was subsequently 
lost. 
3. The Defendant knew of his Court ordered obligation not to encumber, sell, or 
risk losing the HHEICO contract. The Defendant willfully and knowingly refused to comply. 
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4. The Defendant had the ability to comply with the provisions set forth in the 
parties' divorce decree. 
The trial Court provided sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its 
ruling. The Court's findings and conclusions are well supported by the record. Furthermore, the 
trial Court properly denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss because of adequate evidence 
concerning the market value of the HHEICO contract and whether or not it had been 
inappropriately discounted. 
Finally, the trial Court properly awarded attorney fees because the Defendant failed to 
object to the amount and the reasonableness of the fees. Moreover, attorney fees are allowed in 
actions to enforce Court orders, and such awards are based solely on the trial Courts discretion. 
The Court, in its Conclusions of Law, found that the fees requested were reasonable and 
appropriate. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S CONTEMPT RULING IS NOT APPEALABLE. 
Whether a contempt order can be appealed depends on whether the order is classified as 
civil or criminal. 
Under modern authority, an order finding one guilty of criminal 
contempt is generally considered to be a final order separate from the 
ongoing proceedings and appealable as a matter of right.... On the 
other hand, an order finding one to have committed civil contempt is 
considered interlocutory and not appealable as a matter of right. 
Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162,1167 (Utah 1988). 
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A contempt order is civil in nature if its purpose is remedial, "either to coerce an 
individual to comply with a Court order given for the benefit of another party or to compensate 
an aggrieved party for injuries resulting from the failure to comply with an order." Id. at p. 1168. 
A contempt order which is criminal in nature is defined as follows: 
A contempt order is criminal if its purpose is to vindicate the Courts 
authority, as by punishing an individual for disobeying an order, even 
if the order arises from civil proceedings. It is important to note that 
it is the purpose, not the method of punishment, that serves to 
distinguish the two types of proceedings.... One distinguishing factor 
is whether the fine or sentence is conditional. A remedial purpose is 
indicated when the contemnor is allowed to purge himself of the 
contempt by complying with the Court's order. 
Id. at p. 1168. 
In this case, Judge Stirba's contempt order constitutes a finding of civil contempt. Her 
order is clearly designed to compensate the Plaintiff for the Defendant's wrongdoing. The 
Defendant can purge himself of the contempt and avoid going to jail by merely complying with 
the order. Because of the civil nature of the order, it is not appealable as a matter of right, and 
the Defendants appeal should therefore be dismissed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THE DEFENDANT 
IN CONTEMPT OF COURT. 
In order to sustain a finding of contempt for failure to comply with a Court order, the 
Defendant must: 1) have known of the duty imposed by the Court's Order, 2) had the ability to 
comply with the Order, and 3) willfully and knowingly refused to comply. Utah Farm 
Production Credit Association v. Labrum. 762 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1988); Von Hake v. Thomas. 759 
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P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988). From the evidence presented at trial and the record of this proceeding, it 
is clear that the above items have been more than satisfied. 
A. THE DEFENDANT HAD A COURT ORDERED DUTY NOT 
TO ENCUMBER, SELL OR RISK LOSING THE PLAINTIFF'S 
INTEREST IN THE HHEICO CONTRACT. 
The foundation argument for Defendant's appeal is that the divorce decree did not forbid 
him, in any way, from selling, encumbering or disposing of the HHEICO contract. As a result, 
the Defendant argues that he cannot be held in contempt for doing something he felt he was 
entitled to do. The Defendant's argument is wholly without merit and should be disregarded for 
the following reasons: 
1. The Defendant had absolutely no right to sell or encumber the HHEICO contract. In 
Utah, "when a decree of divorce is rendered, the Court may include in it equitable orders relating 
to the children, property, debts or obligations and parties..." UCA 30-3-5(1). It follows that 
Utah Courts have "broad equitable powers to make a fair distribution of parties' property 
irrespective of the form of ownership in which it may be held." Matter of Estate of Manfield, 
856 P.2d 1056 (Utah 1993). 
In the instant case, the trial Court was well within its authority when it divided the 
HHEICO contract. The HHEICO contract was marital property and was therefore subject to 
division, even though the contract was only in Defendant's name. The Plaintiff became the 
owner of 65% of the proceeds of the contract, thus holding a majority interest. Moreover, her 
interest was worth a substantial amount of money ($110,000.90). The Defendant's argument that 
12 
he had the unilateral right to sell, encumber or otherwise deal with the HHEICO contract, even at 
the risk of losing it, so long as the Plaintiff received 65% of any proceeds resulting, is 
incredulous. He had absolutely no right to deal with or risk losing the contract in any way 
without first obtaining the Plaintiff's consent. His actions were motivated by selfishness and 
greed, and are inexcusable. 
2. The law of the case doctrine does not help the Defendant. 
Early in this case, Judge Stirba stated that it appeared the divorce decree did not restrict 
the Defendant from selling the contract, but that the Plaintiff was entitled to 65% of the net 
proceeds from the sale of the note. This statement was made after a short hearing and before 
Judge Stirba had heard any of the evidence at trial. After trial, Judge Stirba properly ruled that 
the Defendant had no right to encumber or sell the contract. The Defendant argues that the "law 
of the case" doctrine prevents the Court from changing or reconsidering its position. The 
Defendant's argument is not a correct statement of Utah law. 
In Utah, the "law of the case" doctrine does not prevent a judge from reconsidering his or 
her previous non-final orders. Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 739 (Utah 1990). Several other 
cases support this proposition. In Salt Lake City Court v. James Contractors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 
45 (Utah App. 1988), the Utah Court of Appeals stated that "any judge is free to change his or 
her mind on the outcome of the case until a decision is formally rendered." A similar ruling was 
set forth in Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d 757, 760 (Utah 1985). In this case, the Court indicated 
that "the trial Court is not inexorably bound by its own precedents." 
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The Defendant has conveniently ignored Utah law on this point. He cites only a 1912 
U.S. Supreme Court Decision and a general article from the C.J.S. Furthermore, his reference to 
UCA Section 78-7-19 is misleading. This section provides: 
If an application for an Order made to a judge of a Court in which the actual 
proceeding is pending, is refused in whole or in part or is granted conditionally, a 
subsequent application for the same Order may not be made to any other judge, 
except of a higher Court.(emphasis added) 
Section 78-7-19 is clearly inapplicable to the facts in this case. The statute prohibits a 
disgruntled party from going to another judge concerning an issue which has been previously 
decided. For the above reasons, the Court properly modified its prior statement, and did not, 
therefore, violate the "law of the case" doctrine. 
B. THE DEFENDANT KNEW OF HIS OBLIGATION 
CONCERNING THE HHEICO CONTRACT. 
The divorce decree clearly sets forth the parties' rights and obligations with respect to 
the HHEICO contract. Paragraph 7 of the decree provides: 
The Plaintiff is awarded 65% of the net proceeds of the HHEICO contract and the 
Defendant is awarded 35% of the net proceeds of the HHEICO contract. The current 
net proceeds from the HHEICO contract are $770.00 per. (sic) The Plaintiff is 
entitled to receive $505.00 per month and the Defendant is entitled to receive 
$271.95 per month from the HHEICO contract. In the event the net amount received 
from HHEICO contract shall differ from the $770.00 per month, then the parties shall 
divide the net proceeds 65% to the Plaintiff and 35% to the Defendant. 
The express language of the divorce decree conveys to Plaintiff a majority interest in the 
HHEICO contract. It is implicit in the decree that the Defendant is not the sole owner of the 
contract and could not, therefore, unilaterally sell or encumber it. Any such action would require 
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the Plaintiff's prior consent. Furthermore, the Defendant's knowledge of the Plaintiff's interest 
in the contract is undisputed. Consider the following: 
1. The Defendant was represented by counsel in the divorce proceedings, 
received a copy of the divorce decree, had read the same, was familiar with the provisions 
contained therein, and did not formally object to any of the provisions. (R. 633-4, 706, 734-6). 
2. The Defendant was aware of the provision in the divorce decree concerning the 
HHEICO contract from the time the divorce was granted, consented to the same, and agreed that 
the Plaintiff be awarded 65% of the net proceeds of the contract. Furthermore, it was never 
agreed, implied or discussed that the Defendant would have the right to encumber the HHEICO 
contract. (R. 634, 706, 736). 
3. At the time the HHEICO contract was pledged, the Defendant was fully aware 
of the provisions set forth in the divorce decree which gave Plaintiff 65% of the proceeds, and 
knew she had an interest therein. He also had a copy of the decree at the time. Prior to pledging 
the contract, the Defendant had been paying Plaintiff her share of the proceeds. (R. 706, 737, 
750-1).3 
3
 The following are excerpts of the Defendant's testimony at trial on August 31, 1994: 
Question (Mr. Hanks): Did you object to any provisions in the divorce decree? 
Answer (Mr. Hammond): It was too late. 
Q: Well, did you object to any? 
A: No. (R p. 735 lines 18-22). 
* * * 
Q: You were aware, weren't you, that your ex-wife was given an interest in this HHEICO 
contract, weren't you? 
A: An interest? No, she was not given an interest in the contract. 
Q: Let me show you paragraph 7. You have seen that paragraph before, haven't you? 
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The Defendant was fully aware of the Plaintiff's rights under the contract from the 
time the divorce was granted. His interpretation of the decree and what he felt it allowed him to 
do is unreasonable and ignores the Plaintiff's property rights. 
C. THE DEFENDANT HAD THE ABILITY TO COMPLY WITH THE ORDER. 
In order to comply with paragraph 7 of the decree, the Defendant simply had to divide the 
monthly funds which he received from the HHEICO contract and pay Plaintiff her share. The 
A: Yes I have. 
Q: And that gives your ex-wife the right to receive $505 each month from the $777 
resulting from that contract, doesn't it? 
A: She is entitled to 65 percent of the net proceeds. It does not give her an interest in that 
contract. 
Q: But you're aware of that provision, weren't you? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And you were at the time the divorce was granted, weren't you? 
A: Yes. And I didn't agree with it. 
Q: But you agreed with the provision and the decree was signed, didn't you? 
A: I agreed — yes. 
Q: And you were aware of exactly what it said. Correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And at the time that the HHEICO contract was pledged, you were aware of that 
contract. Correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Or the Decree. And you had a copy of the decree at that time, didn't you? 
A: Like I said, I received it in July or August. (R p. 736 line 4 - p. 737 line 7). 
Q: When you sold that contract, were you thinking of her at all? 
A: Yes I was. I knew that, according to this divorce decree, there was an obligation on my 
part to pay her 65 percent of the net proceeds that I received of that. (R p.750 lines 16-20) 
* * * 
Q: You sold the contract knowing full well of the obligation to pay her? 
A: Yes. (R p. 751 lines 2-5). 
16 
Defendant provided no evidence that he was unable to do this simple task. The Defendant's only 
argument is that he was financially compelled to pledge the same. Not only is Defendant's 
financial situation irrelevant to his ability to divide the monthly payments received from the 
HHEICO contract, it provides no excuse, whatsoever for his actions. In fact, the Defendant's 
testimony provided no hint of financial necessity. In his testimony of August 31,1995, the 
Defendant stated that his financial requirements were based on what he "wanted" rather than 
what he actually needed: 
0 : You seem to try to tell the Court there was some incredible 
pressure for you to sell or encumber the contract to save the home. 
A: There was. 
Q: But you could have, in fact, kept the money from the contract, 
the $250.00, plus the amount you were already paying for the 
mortgage to have more than enough to go out and rent a place. 
A: For $650.00 I could have rented an apartment. 
Q: So there wasn't a dire financial pressure, was there? 
A: The pressure was I wanted to buy my son-in-law and daughter's 
equity in the house and I wanted to remain in the house. 
Q: You didn't have to do that. 
A: You don't have to do anything in life, do you? 
Q: But you wouldn't have been homeless, would you? 
A: No. 
Q: You would have had adequate funds to rent a place and been 
just fine. 
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A: I'm sure I could have rented a place. 
Q: In fact, this deal that you did was not caused by financial 
necessity, was it? 
A: Yes, it was. I felt it was. I felt that I wanted to remain in that 
house. I was engaged to be married. I wanted a place to live. 
Q: And so you were totally thinking about your own wants and 
desires and you didn't think at all about Berdene Dennison, did 
you? 
A: She has her own life now and I have my own life. I was 
concerned about myself, my daughter and my future family and 
wife. 
Q: And you weren't thinking about her, were you? 
A: She has her own life. (R p.749 lines 7-25; p.750 lines 1-14). 
Additionally, "where there is a judgment that a party do an act... which judgment stands 
unattacked, it is presumed that the party has the ability to perform; and that the complainant 
makes a prima facie case of contempt by showing failure to comply with the judgment." Thomas 
v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119,1121 (Utah 1977). The Defendant has failed to set forth any evidence 
to rebut this presumption. 
Finally, the Defendant's alleged inability to perform is no defense because his inability to 
perform was the result of his own actions. Brown v. Cook, 123 Utah 505, 260 P.2d 544 (Utah 
1953). Clearly, the Defendant's inability to pay Plaintiff 65% of the proceeds from the HHEICO 
contract was caused by his own wrongful conduct, thereby rendering his actions inexcusable. 
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D. THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT PROVIDE A SOLID BASIS FOR ITS 
CONTEMPT RULING. 
The Court provided ample facts on which to base a finding of contempt. First, the Court 
found that the Defendant did not have the ability to sell or encumber the HHEICO contract and 
that he was well aware of the provisions which created the Plaintiffs interest. Paragraphs 9,10, 
and 11 of the Findings provide sufficient basis for this conclusion: 
9. Paragraph 7 of the Divorce Decree clearly provides an income 
stream to the Plaintiff from the HHEICO contract. The Defendant 
was not entitled to take action, unilaterally, to defeat that right. The 
Plaintiffs interest in the HHEICO contract was a bargained for 
provision in the Divorce Decree. Both parties were represented by 
counsel. 
Mr. Hammond indicated that when he obtained the Divorce 
Decree, he contacted his counsel because he evidently didn't like the 
language set forth in paragraph 7. However, no action was taken to 
amend the decree. The fact that Mr. Hammond complained to his 
counsel and was not happy with that provision suggests, in and of 
itself, that he was aware that there were limitations on what he could 
do with that particular contract. 
10. The HHEICO contract was lost because Mr. Hammond took 
unilateral actions without conferring with the Plaintiff or obtaining 
her consent to do the same. 
11. It is plain to the Court, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
under the express terms of paragraph 7, the Defendant had no right to 
encumber the HHEICO contract and he had no right to risk losing it. 
There did not need to be a specific provision in the decree to make 
clear that he was prevented from encumbering the HHEICO contract. 
By virtue of the language in the decree, it is clear that he was not 
entitled to encumber that contract. 
Second, the Findings dealt with Hammond's ability to comply with the order. Paragraph 
13 of the Findings provides: 
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13. The Defendant did not encumber the HHEICO contract because 
of financial duress or compulsion. The Defendant claimed that he 
encumbered the HHEICO contract in an investment designed to 
return a large profit so that he could buy out his daughter and son-in-
law's interest in a house. The Defendant also testified that because 
the investment went sour, the home was sold he used his share of the 
proceeds to pay a debt owed to his mother. The Defendant was not 
compelled or required to do either of the above. The Defendant was, 
however, obligated to abide by the terms of the Divorce Decree which 
provided a monthly payment to the Plaintiff. The Defendant ignored 
his Court ordered obligation. 
The record amply supports the Court's Conclusions and Finding of contempt. The 
Court's findings, taken as a whole, clearly support a knowing and willful violation. The 
Defendant was aware of the provision awarding Plaintiff an interest in the HHEICO contract and 
acted in knowing and willful defiance thereof. 
Finally, the Defendant has the burden, on appeal, to show that "in the light most 
favorable to the trial Court, the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the trial Courts 
findings." Utah Farm Bureau Production Credit Association, at p. 5-6. The evidence at trial, as 
summarized in the Statement of Facts, provides overwhelming support for the trial Courts 
findings. The Defendant has altogether failed to show where the evidence is lacking. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ORDERED THE DEEFENDANT TO 
REPAY THE PLAINTIFF AND TO SERVE THIRTY DAYS IN JAIL. 
In Utah, a Court has several options when imposing sanctions for contempt. The Court 
can impose a jail sentence of up to 30 days (UCA 78-32-10), can award damages to the 
aggrieved party (UCA 78-32-11), and can use imprisonment to compel performance (UCA 78-
32-12). The Court properly used each of these statutes to provide Plaintiff with an appropriate 
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remedy. 
The Defendant's argument that there is no basis for Plaintiff's damages should be 
disregarded. The evidence at trial established that the HHEICO contract had 218 payments 
remaining, and that the Plaintiff received $505.05 per month from each payment. There was no 
evidence presented by the Defendant that the payments would cease.4 Even if they did cease, the 
contract was secure because it was backed by real estate. 
Finally, the Defendant argues that the Court's ruling constitutes an improper modification 
of the divorce decree in violation of Rule 6-404(1) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
This argument fails because the Defendant raises this issue for the first time on appeal. Even if 
the Court were to consider the argument, it easily fails because the Court is not modifying the 
decree, rather, the Court is enforcing the decree and sanctioning the Defendant for his contempt. 
4Q: (Mr. Hanks) Up to that time, Mr. Hammond, had you ever missed a payment? Had 
you ever missed receiving a payment on the HHEICO contract? 
A: (Mr. Hammond) Not that I can remember, no. 
Q: So it provided a good stream of income, didn't it? 
A: Yeah 
Q: You had no reason to believe that those payments would ever cease, did you? 
A: No, I didn't. (R. p. 743 line 22-25; p. 744 lines 1-5). 
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IV. THE TRIAL PROPERLY RULED ON THE DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS. 
The Defendant argues that the trial Court improperly denied his motion to dismiss 
because there was no evidence presented as to the market value of the note and whether it was 
discounted inappropriately. The Defendant's argument fails for the following reasons. First, the 
Defendant never sold the note -- he risked it as collateral for a highly speculative mining venture 
and subsequently lost it. He got absolutely nothing in return. This is certainly evidence of an 
inappropriate discount. 
Second, the Plaintiff provided ample evidence as to the value of the note. Exhibit P-6, 
which is an amortization schedule of the HHEICO contract, shows that the contract would be 
paid over a period of 249 months. Testimony at trial established that 31 payments had been 
made, leaving 218 remaining. The principal balance of the contract at the time it was lost was 
$274,993.00. Furthermore, the Defendant agreed that the present value of an income stream of 
$505.05 per month for 218 months at an interest rate of 9.75% (the contract rate) is $51,509.37. 
(R 383). This, of course, is the present value of the payments Plaintiff would have received had 
the Defendant not interfered. This evidence is more than sufficient to establish the market value 
of the note and whether it was inappropriately discounted. 
V. THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES, 
INCLUDING ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL. 
"In an action to enforce the provisions of a divorce decree, an award of attorney fees is 
based solely upon the trial Courts discretion...". Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027 (Utah App. 
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1992). Furthermore, attorney fees may be awarded in a contempt proceeding pursuant to UCA 
Section 78-32-11. Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan , 872 P.2d 487 (Utah App. 1994). In addition, 
when a party in a divorce action is awarded attorney fees at the trial level, and then prevails in an 
appeal, attorney fees can be granted to the successful party. Lyngle at p. 1059. 
In the instant case, Plaintiffs counsel proffered evidence as to the amount and 
reasonableness of his fees. (R. 672-3; 708-9). It is significant that the Defendant never objected 
to the reasonableness of the fees, and stated "this lump sum isn't too bad" when referring to 
Plaintiffs flat fee arrangement. (R. 673, lines 4-9). Since the Defendant failed to object to the 
reasonableness of the fees at the trial Court level, he cannot now raise the issue for the first time 
on appeal. DeVilliers v. Utah County. 882 P.2d 1161,1168 (Utah App. 1994); Jensen v. 
Bowcutt. 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah App. 1995). 
The Defendant's argument that the Court made no reference to the reasonableness of the 
fees is wrong. In paragraph 4 of the Conclusions of Law, the Court stated: "The attorney fees 
and costs incurred by the Plaintiff are reasonable in amount and were necessarily incurred 
because of the Defendant's actions." 
Finally, the Defendant incorrectly states that the Plaintiff did not prevail in this action. 
The Defendant's argument begs the question - "If the Plaintiff did not prevail, why is the 
Defendant now pursuing this appeal?" 
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CONCLUSION 
This case turns on a simple question. Did the Defendant have or not have the right to 
sell, encumber or risk losing the HHEICO contract without the Plaintiff's consent. The answer 
is obvious. The Defendant's actions were in total disregard of Plaintiff's rights under the divorce 
decree. The trial Court responded appropriately and its ruling should be upheld. Accordingly, 
the Defendant's appeal should be dismissed and the Plaintiff be awarded her attorney fees and 
costs for defending the same. 
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